This paper explores the role played by new public firms teamed with public equity finance in the recent rapid ascent of the high-tech sector of U.S. manufacturing. The magnitude of stock issues, together with estimates from dynamic investment models, indicates that public equity finance was important for the very high level of R&D investment achieved by new public firms. By 2000, in five key industries, recent public entrants had obtained close to half of the industry sales and performed more than half of the total R&D. In addition, some public entrants rapidly displaced leading incumbents. Our study provides a detailed example of Schumpeterian creative destruction but with one important difference -new public firms, relying heavily on public equity, played the star role.
I. Introduction
A rapid transformation of U.S. manufacturing occurred in the last few decades of the 20th century.
By 2000, a number of high-tech industries --drugs, office and computing equipment, communications equipment, electronic components, industrial measuring and control instruments and medical instruments --had grown in size to eclipse virtually all of the major industries which dominated manufacturing for much of the 20 th century. By 2000, based on value added figures and the new NAICS classification system, electronic components (e.g., semiconductors) was the largest U.S. manufacturing industry, drugs was third, instruments was fifth and communications equipment was sixth. NSF figures show that in 2000 the six high-tech industries accounted for around 47% of manufacturing R&D and almost 30% of the total R&D of all firms in the U.S. economy. 1 Clearly, a very large share of the new knowledge relevant for macro economic growth arises from these industries. In this paper we explore the role played by new public firms, teamed with public equity finance, in the recent ascent of the high-tech sector of U.S. manufacturing. Little attention has been paid to the impact of new public firms and their use of public equity finance. This lack of attention is surprising. In the U.S., in modern high-tech industries, public firms account for nearly all of the output and R&D.
Furthermore, it is likely that an important advantage of the public firm is access to public equity finance. This is particularly true for young high-tech firms, where debt finance is typically negligible and internal equity finance is often small or negative. Nevertheless, public equity finance has typically been ignored, 1 For statistics on manufacturing and the entire U.S. economy, see Science Resource Statistics, National Science Foundation. Five of the six industries in our study are at the top of the list of industries with the greatest number of innovations according to Acs and Audretsch's (1988, 1990 ) examination of SBA innovation data. 2 In recent years, an explosion of literature on endogenous growth focuses on technological change created by R&D of profit maximizing firms. See Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a review of the literature.
possibly due to misleading aggregate statistics suggesting that public equity finance is unimportant in the U.S. economy.
The first objective of our paper is to explore the importance of public equity finance for R&D, the main investment for high-tech firms and the pivotal investment for innovation and creative destruction.
We use GMM to estimate dynamic R&D models similar to those developed in Bond and Meghir (1994) and Bond et al. (2003) . To our knowledge, our study is the first to include measures of public equity finance in an R&D model. We estimate R&D regressions both for new entrants and incumbents with a variety of controls for demand. As expected, we find no evidence that public equity impacts the R&D of incumbents. For entrants, however, public equity finance is the only form of financing that is statistically significant and economically important in our regressions. We also examine the recent bubble in the Nasdaq which generated a remarkable boom and bust in the availability of public equity in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. The extreme variation in public equity issues, together with the large estimated coefficients in our regressions, generates the testable prediction that there should have been a boom and bust in R&D for public entrants, but not for incumbents, who are not equity dependent firms. We in fact find that the public entrants in our sample did experience a boom and bust in R&D investment that lines up well with the boom and bust in public equity finance. In contrast, there is little change in R&D for high-tech incumbents during this period. Together, these results suggest that shifts in the availability of public equity finance had a substantial impact on the R&D of new public entrants in recent years.
The second objective of our paper is to examine whether the public entrants led to creative destruction in the high-tech tech sector of manufacturing. While there are several studies of the long-run financial performance of IPOs, we are aware of no other studies that examine the long-run economic impact of new public firms. 3 We present evidence on the impact of cohorts of new public entrants over time, similar to the approach taken in the seminal study by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) . We find that most high-tech incumbents exited the market, rates of R&D investment for new public firms were much greater than those of surviving incumbents, and R&D intensity rose rapidly over time with each successive cohort of entrants. In addition, we show that in five of the six industries, incumbents lost most of their market share of sales and R&D, with almost all of the loss due to the entry cohorts of the 1980s and 1990s. We also report descriptive regressions indicating that the evolution of shares of cohort sales and R&D are closely tied to public equity finance but not to other forms of finance. Finally, we
show that a substantial number of individual public entrants, making heavy use of public equity, quickly became leading firms, overtaking many of the largest incumbents. At an aggregate level, the impact of new public firms in the six industries was very large: by 2000, new public entrants in the six high-tech industries accounted for approximately 29% of the total public-firm R&D in manufacturing and 24% of the public-firm R&D in the entire economy.
One of the main implications of our paper pertains to the process of creative destruction. The extremely high rates of R&D investment by innovative entrants and the swift displacement of many incumbents is an impressive example of creative destruction. Our findings, however, differ in one important respect from Schumpeter's (1942) description of creative destruction. Schumpeter emphasized that large established firms, diversifying from other industries and relying on internal finance, were the key innovative entrants and the primary force of creative destruction. In contrast, our study shows that, in recent decades, a primary source of creative destruction in the high-tech sector was thousands of startup companies relying heavily on external public equity finance.
II. The Ascent of the U.S. High-Tech Sector
Autos, steel, and to a lesser extent airplanes, were the leading manufacturing industries for much of the 20 th century. In terms of value-added, autos, steel, aircraft and petroleum refining were the four largest three-digit SIC manufacturing industries in the period 1950 -1980 . In 1953 In 1950, the U.S. accounted for two-thirds of the world's auto output and 47% of the world's raw steel production. By 1980, the U.S. accounted for 21% of the world's automobile production and only 14% of the world's steel production, and Japan was the leading producer in both industries. 5 The combined market share of GM and Ford was in excess of 80% between 1955 and 1985. The leading firms in the steel industry at the start of the century remained dominant throughout most of the 20 th century. Boeing, founded in 1916, is currently the only U.S. producer of large commercial aircraft. 6 United States Department of Commerce, "An Assessment of United States Competitiveness in High-Technology Industries," February 1983. Most of the other three-digit industries in SIC 28 (chemicals) and SIC 35 (machinery) would not currently be considered high-tech industries. We also do not consider the aerospace industry (in SIC 37), a high-tech industry in which the government supplies much of the R&D financing. 7 Starting in 1997, the U.S. Census of Manufacturing is based on the NAICS classification system. Most of the industries have a close counterpart to the old SIC classification system. In particular, drugs, computers, communications equipment, and electronic components are all separate NAICS industries. The two instrument industries are combined into a single industry (3345). Using the mapping of 4-digit SIC industries into 5-digit NAICS industries, we computed the valued added figures for the constituent parts of SIC 382 and SIC 384 that now appear in NAICS 3345. Based on these numbers, old SIC 382 plus old SIC 384 would be the 5th largest industry in 2000. These figures are also used to compute the 18.9% value added figure for our high-tech industries for the year 2000.
In 1970, there were several large established incumbents in all six of the high-tech industries. For example, in the computer industry, IBM was the leading firm but there were several other major corporations active in the industry, including General Electric, RCA, Honeywell, DEC and Control Data. 8 In the 1990s, U.S. world market shares rose in most industries and by 2000, the U.S. was the leading producer of drugs, communications equipment, office and computing equipment, semiconductors, and medical and scientific instruments.
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III. Financing High-Tech Firms
Public firms account for the vast majority of R&D and output in the U.S. high-tech sector and there are almost no major private firms in high-tech manufacturing. A likely reason is the need for substantial external financing in the early years of firm development combined with the disadvantages of debt finance for most high-tech investment. For young high-tech firms, R&D investment greatly exceeds physical investment (see Table 2 ) and it has long been argued that it is difficult to finance intangible investments with debt. 10 In particular, limited collateral value of intangible assets may greatly restrict the use of debt, since risky firms typically must pledge collateral to obtain debt finance (Berger and Udell, 1990 ). Hall (2002) reviews the literature on capital structure and concludes that "the capital structure of R&D-intensive firms customarily exhibits considerably less leverage than that of other firms."
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Equity finance has several advantages over debt finance for young high-tech firms: there are no collateral requirements, shareholders share in upside returns and additional equity does not accentuate problems associated with financial distress. There are multiple forms of equity finance, including internal finance and private equity finance. For young high-tech firms, because of inefficient firm size and startup costs, internal equity finance is usually small in size, and is frequently negative. Private equity 8 In SIC 366, Motorola, Harris Corp., and General Instrument were large incumbents. The leading producers in SIC 367 were Texas Instruments, Motorola, National Semiconductor and Fairchild. In SIC 382, Honeywell, Applera Corp., and Beckman Coulter were the major incumbents. In SIC 384, Johnson and Johnson, American Hospital, Mallinckrodt, Sybron and Becton Dickinson were the leading producers. 9 In the late 1990s, the U.S. exported more than twice as much high-tech output as Japan, the world's second leading exporter of high-tech goods (NSF, 2002, Figure 6.5) . Science & Engineering Indicators (NSF, 2002, Figure 6-3) reports that in 1998, the U.S. had a 36% share of world high-tech production, followed by Japan with a 20% share. The U.S. share of the market rose from 30% in 1988 to 36% in 1998. Japan's share fell from 26% in 1991 to 20% in 1998. France, Germany and Italy also experienced major declines in world shares. 10 See Hall (2002) , Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) , and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) for summaries of the literature on why R&D-intensive firms may have very limited access to debt finance.
finance, in the form of venture capital, has become an increasingly important source of funds for young, high-tech firms, and can be viewed as a complement to public equity. VC financing, however, is designed to last for a relatively brief period (e.g., 3 to 4 years) before the firm goes public, is acquired, or is liquidated (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . While VC financing may often be a necessary condition if a start-up company is to reach the point at which it can go public, becoming a public firm is "the point of entry that gives firms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to emerge and grow" (Fama and French, 2004, p. 229) . Evidence for this conclusion can be seen in are often small and can be negative (see Brealey and Myers, 2000, Table 14 .1). Looking only at the aggregate net equity figure, however, obscures the fact that many firms, in the early stage of their life cycle, make extensive use of follow-up stock issues, as we show later in the paper. Over the last three decades, there has been a sharp upward trend in the issuance of public equity finance, particularly for young firms listed on the Nasdaq.
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The creation of the Nasdaq in 1971 likely greatly expanded the availability of public equity to small high-tech firms. Major improvements occurred in the early 1980s with the creation of the National Marketing System. Nearly all of the public entrants in our sample went public on the Nasdaq, which was typically their only choice because they could not have met the listing requirements (e.g., profitability) of the major exchanges. Prior to the Nasdaq, it was difficult to obtain accurate and timely information on OTC stock prices and trading of shares was cumbersome. There is a large body of evidence indicating 11 See, for example, Friend and Lang (1988) , Hall (1992) and Bhagat and Welch (1995) . 12 Jay Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/seoall.html) identifies, for the entire economy, 1082 seasoned offerings in the 1970s, 2468 offerings in the 1980s, and 4867 offerings in the 1990s. A large fraction of offerings occur in the high-tech sectors of manufacturing (Loughran and Ritter, 1997) . See also Fama and French (2005) for facts on the use of public equity finance.
that the Nasdaq improved efficiency and liquidity in equity markets. 13 Several studies, summarized by Baker (1987) , find that firms listed on the Nasdaq do not appear to face a higher cost of equity finance than firms listed on the NYSE. An implication of this body of research is that the creation of the Nasdaq system in 1971, and the subsequent improvements, greatly increased the availability of public equity finance to young high-tech firms. Indeed, Fama and French (2004) , based on the changing characteristics of newly listed firms (mostly on Nasdaq), conclude that a rightward shift in the supply of public equity occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
We summarize this discussion of financing young high-tech firms as follows. For reasons noted above, internal finance is often small or negative, venture capital financing is limited in scope, and debt finance is essentially unavailable for most young firms. Though the marginal cost of public equity likely exceeds the marginal cost of internal equity, the marginal cost need not be rapidly rising, which means that small firms have the potential to raise hundreds of millions of dollars on the Nasdaq over a very brief period of time. 14 Thus, public equity is potentially a critical source of finance for many firms at the early stage of their life-cycle when heavy funding is often required to finance the R&D needed to commercialize technological breakthroughs. If there is no close substitute for public equity finance, a testable prediction is that the availability of public equity should impact the R&D investment of equitydependent firms. Public equity should not matter, however, for incumbents who are not equity dependent. A related prediction is that booms and busts in the availability of equity will lead to corresponding fluctuations in R&D investment for public entrants only. Finally, the availability of public equity should impact the rate at which entrants take market share from incumbents.
13 Ingebretsen (2002) discusses many other shortcomings in the OTC market prior to the Nasdaq, including large broker markups and lack of regulations, information and liquidity. He states (p. 19) that because of these problems "relatively few firms went public via the OTC market." Studies report substantial reductions in the bid-ask spread following the introduction of Nasdaq and several studies have found that the liquidity of firms traded on the Nasdaq compares favorably to firms traded on the NYSE. For a review of this literature, see Groth and Dubofsky (1987) . 14 Reasons why the marginal cost of equity may not increase rapidly include the following: i) new share issues do not require collateral and ii) new share issues do not raise the probability of financial distress.
IV. IPOs over Time and Across Industries
A. The Data
Our study begins in 1970, which is a sensible starting date for two reasons. First, each of our six industries had many large established incumbents in place in 1970. We refer to all IPOs from 1970 to the present as "new public entrants." We could choose a later date, such as 1980, as the starting date for "new entrants" and the main findings in the paper would not change. The reason is that relatively few high-tech firms went public in the 1970s, and their market share is small compared to the entry cohorts of the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 5 ). The second reason for our start date is that one of our primary data sources, Thompson Financial's SDC New Issues Database, begins in 1970. The SDC database is commonly used in the economics and finance literature (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and contains information on the year and dollar size of all IPOs. We identify around 3,600 IPOs in manufacturing between 1970 and 2004. 15 We then match this list of manufacturing IPOs to the list of publicly traded firms in the Compustat database. 16 Compustat reports crucial information, such as sources of finance and R&D investment, that is typically not available to the researcher in other entry studies.
We do not include spinoffs or carve-outs in our list of IPOs, nor do we include mergers that created a new firm. While the number of spinoffs is not large, some large firms have been created through spinoffs in recent years. For example, Lucent Technologies was spunoff from AT&T in 1996, and Agilent was spunoff from Hewlett Packard in 1999. For the purposes of our study, it would be inappropriate to consider these firms "new public entrants." Rather, these firms are ex-divisions of major incumbents, and we treat them separately throughout our study.
For all our tables, we examined the results for each high-tech industry, and only pool the six industries if there are no outlier industries. For some issues that we believe are of secondary importance, we briefly summarize our findings but do not report the results in a table. In all such cases, tables are available on request. In most cases we provide information on different cohorts of entrants, similar to the approach in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) . We divide the entrants into seven five-year cohorts, Table 1 given that the six industries account for less than five percent of the industries in U.S. manufacturing. Table 1 shows that public firms in manufacturing have become ever more concentrated in a small number of high-tech industries because of the concentrated pattern of IPOs in the 1980s and 1990s.
B. IPOs by Three-digit Industries
C. Characteristics of the IPO
We briefly summarize the key characteristics of the IPOs in our sample. Firms are typically very young at the time they go public, with a median age of around six years in both the 1980s and 1990s.
18 17 While not reported in the table, of the 1532 firms in existence in 2004, 59 were surviving incumbents, 1034 were surviving IPOs from the period 1970-2004, and 439 were "other" firms, which are new public firms in Compustat not identified as IPOs. These firms include spinoffs and best effort offerings and are described at the start of section six. "Other" firms account for only a small share of economic activity. 18 Most of the age data was graciously provided by Laura Field and Jay Ritter. See Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) . For a small number of the IPOs we compiled age data from various issues of Moody's, from Hoover's Online, and from the International Directory of Company Histories. For the 1995-1999 cohort, the median IPO was $27.57 million, or more than twice the size of existing firm assets. These results highlight the increasing importance of the first infusion of public equity for high-tech public entrants.
V. The Role of Public Equity Finance
One goal of the paper is to explore the importance of public equity for public entrants in the hightech sector. We begin this section by providing information on financing after the IPO. We then provide regression results for a dynamic R&D investment model, including results for a narrow window containing the recent bubble in the Nasdaq, a period of dramatic changes in the availability of public equity finance. Table 2 reports information on investment and financing over the first two five-year intervals (t = 1 to t = 5 and t = 6 to t = 10) following the IPO. The first two columns are for firms in the six high-tech industries and the rest of the table is for all other new public firms in manufacturing. (We present the numbers for the rest of manufacturing to provide a basis for comparison.) All investment and financing variables are cumulative: we sum the annual values over the respective five-year periods and scale by beginning of period firm assets. We report medians and means that are winsorized at the 1% level to avoid undue influence of extreme values. Since we are summing over each five-year period, we report numbers only for firms that survive all five years of the particular period in question. To measure internal equity finance we add R&D investment to the firm's reported cash flow because R&D is treated as an expense and we want, for purposes of comparison, the broadest possible measure of internal equity finance (see Hall 1992) . that gross cash flow is negative for a substantial fraction of observations and that high-tech firms rarely pay dividends. Overall, these numbers identify a far more important role for follow-up equity issues than is generally recognized.
A. Investment and Financing After the IPO
Turning to the rest of manufacturing, there are some noteworthy differences compared to high-tech firms. In particular, R&D is far smaller, with medians of only 0.08 in each of the first two periods. 19 As a consequence, total investment, either at the median or the mean, is much lower in the rest of manufacturing. Furthermore, cumulative stock issues are also far smaller than the values for the six hightech industries.
For us, the big question is: How do young high-tech firms manage to finance such high levels of intangible investment in the years immediately following the IPO? From a pure accounting point of view, the mean of cash flow plus debt financing is approximately half the size of total investment in both periods. Furthermore, given the nature of intangible investment, there is likely little scope for raising additional debt financing and dividends are zero for virtually all high-tech observations. This leaves public equity financing as the likely key marginal source of finance. Note that public equity finance does not appear to play this role in the non-high tech sector, presumably because intangible investment is small, resulting in little need for additional financing beyond internal cash flows and debt.
B. Regression Analysis
We focus on R&D investment because it is the main investment of young high-tech firms and is the investment associated with creative destruction. We modify a dynamic investment model developed by Bond and Meghir (1994) and Bond et al. (2003) to examine the role of financial effects for investment.
Both of these studies derive an Euler equation for optimal physical capital accumulation with adjustment costs for imperfectly competitive firms. 20 Bond et al. (2003, p. 153) state that an advantage of their approach is that "under the maintained structure, the model captures the influence of current expectations of future profitability on current investment decisions; and it can therefore be argued that current or lagged financial variables should not enter this specification merely as proxies for expected future profitability."
To extend their model to R&D investment, it is important to note that R&D is also subject to costs of adjustment and there is considerable evidence that these adjustment costs are large, perhaps even larger than physical investment. 21 It is natural to consider profits as a function of the accumulated stock of R&D and an estimating equation for R&D (based on the Euler condition) can be derived that is analogous to the physical investment equation in Bond and Meghir (1994) . The stock of R&D (the analog of the stock of physical investment used in investment studies) is not reported by the firm and can only be crudely approximated. We therefore scale all regression variables by total assets, which follows the approach in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) who also use total assets as a scale variable in firm-level regressions for both physical capital and R&D.
With the modification noted above, the estimating equation in the absence of financing constraints becomes:
(1)
The Euler equation estimation approach eliminates terms in the solution to the optimization problem that depend on unobservable expectations and it replaces expected values of observable variables with actual values plus an expectation error orthogonal to pre-determined instruments under the assumption of rational expectations. 21 See Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) for a discussion of adjustment costs for R&D and a list of studies that find that adjustment costs for R&D may be considerably higher than for physical investment.
where RD is research and development spending for firm j in period t, TA is the beginning-of-period stock of firm assets, and SALES is firm revenue. 22 The variable GCF denotes gross cash flow, the flow of internal funds defined consistently with the previous literature on finance and R&D. 23 The variable d it is a time-specific effect (defined at the industry level, i) and α j is a firm-specific effect. The parameters in equation (1) can be interpreted as functions of the structural parameters of the original optimization problem presented in Bond and Meghir (1994) . 24 We expect that the structural parameters for incumbent firms (who are not likely to face binding financing constraints) to line up relatively closely to the predictions of the null model discussed in the footnote above.
The main difference (besides our focus on R&D) between equation (1) and the estimating model in Bond and Meghir (1994) is the treatment of time dummies. While Bond and Meghir (1994) employ aggregate time dummies, in all of our regressions we include time dummies (d it ) disaggregated to the three-digit industry level. This broader set of time dummies controls for industry-specific changes in technological opportunities that could affect the demand for R&D.
Equation (1) is the baseline equation for our study. To examine the relationship between R&D and public equity finance, we add current period and lagged new share issues (STK/TA) to equation (1), precisely as is done in Bond and Meghir (1994 , Table 3 ). To examine the role of internal equity finance, we also add current period cash flow (GCF/TA). We ignore debt because of its lack of importance as a source of finance (see Table 2 ).
We estimate R&D regressions for all public entrants and incumbents in our sample that have Bond et al. 2003) , the baseline specification also includes a stock of debt term. Including this term has no impact on our main results (consistent with low levels of debt) and we therefore leave this term out of our specification. Additionally, in their specification, the beginning-of-period sales term controls for imperfect competition, something which may be of limited relevance for small public firms in the hightech sector. 23 See Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) . Because R&D is treated as a current expense for accounting purposes, the GCF variable adds R&D expenses to the standard measure of net cash flow (after-tax earnings plus depreciation allowances). 24 The positive coefficient on the level of the lagged dependent variable and the negative coefficient on the square both depend on discount and depreciation rates. The structural model implies that both coefficients will slightly exceed one in absolute value. The lagged sales-to-asset ratio has a positive coefficient under imperfect competition that goes to zero as the elasticity of demand faced by the firm approaches the competitive value. The lagged gross cash flow-asset ratio appears in the specification without financing constraints, but it has a negative sign. Meghir (1994), we use instruments dated t-3 and t-4, as instruments dated t-2 are not valid if the error term in levels is an MA(1). Sargan tests do not reject the null, at conventional levels, that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. We also report tests for first-order (m1) and second order (m2) autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. As Arellano and Bond (1991) discuss, the GMM estimator is inconsistent if second-order serial correlation is present. The tests of no first-order serial correlation are rejected, but we can never reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation for public entrants. Finally, for each type of finance, we report a chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the current and lagged coefficients is equal to zero.
The first four columns in Table 3 The next pair of regressions (columns three and four) adds the financial variables (GCF/TA and STK/TA). We also add contemporaneous sales (SALES/TA) as an additional control for demand. For the entrants, the point estimates for current and lagged cash flow are small and statistically insignificant.
The small coefficients for cash flow are not surprising, given the large fraction of negative cash flow observations for entrants reported in Table 2 . 25 On the other hand, the point estimate for current stock issues is large (0.151) and highly statistically significant. In contrast, for incumbents, there are small, positive coefficients on current and lagged cash flow, and small, negative coefficients on current and lagged net stock issues. It is important to keep in mind that the financial variables are instrumented with lagged values dated t-3 and t-4, and thus there is little concern of reverse causation between new entrant equity issues and R&D.
To summarize, stock issues is the only financial variable that is statistically significant and quantitatively important for new entrant investment in R&D. Our interpretation is that public equity is the marginal source of finance and its availability is a binding constraint on R&D. Furthermore, the fact that the estimated baseline coefficients for the incumbents are close to the theoretical values predicted by the structural model, together with the negligible financial variables for these firms, provides additional confidence that our finding of a stock effect for entrants is not due to mis-specification in the regression equation. This kind of heterogeneity has been widely used to test for the existence of financing constraints and helps to empirically identify shifts in the supply of finance.
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C. Further Analysis: The Nasdaq Bubble
A strong test of causality would be to examine the behavior of new entrant R&D during a time period when access to public equity finance disappeared. The closest "natural experiment" we have is the recent Nasdaq bubble. 27 The Nasdaq Index stood a 1,574 at the start of 1998, below, the bubble and its collapse generated a remarkable boom and bust in the use of public equity finance for public entrants, permitting additional tests of the importance of this form of finance for R&D.
An extensive literature shows that stock-market mispricing can lower the cost of external equity finance and increase the availability and use of public equity. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishney 26 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticize heterogeneity tests. Bond, et al. (2003, p. 154) argue, however, that it "remains the case in [the Kaplan-Zingales] model that a firm facing no financial constraint (no cost premium for external finance) would display no excess sensitivity to cash flow," in which case the Kaplan-Zingales criticism of heterogeneity tests does not apply. 27 Bond and Cummins (2000, p. 100) study stock prices and intangible investment in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s and conclude that there are "serious anomalies in the behavior of share prices." A number of theoretical models explain bubbles in stock prices. In one class of models, investors face constraints on their ability to sell short, causing prices to disproportionately reflect the views of the most optimistic sellers (e.g., Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002) . In these models, increases in the dispersion of beliefs about fundamental values can lead to bubbles.
(1990, p. 160) note that for firms facing financing constraints, overpriced equity lowers the cost of capital and may allow constrained firms the opportunity to issue shares and increase investment. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that firms are more likely to issue equity when stock prices are high, and Loughran and Ritter (1995, p 46) state that their "evidence is consistent with a market where firms take advantage of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity, when, on average, they are substantially overvalued." Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003, p. 970) examine the "equity finance channel," including the key prediction "that those firms that are in need of external equity finance will have investment that is especially sensitive to the non-fundamental component of stock prices." They regress various measures of investment (including the sum of physical and R&D investment) on measures of Tobin's Q and show that equity-dependent firms are the most sensitive to Q as well as the realization of future stock prices.
In addition, a number of other studies report empirical evidence that stock market mispricing affects the investment of equity-dependent firms. Given the extremely large variation in public equity issues, it is important to check whether our regression results hold up for narrow windows around the Nasdaq bubble. The final pair of regressions in Table 3 examines one such window, the time period 1997-2002. 29 The results for this narrow period are very similar to those for the full period . For incumbents, the coefficients for the financial 28 Polk and Sapienza (2004) find that firm physical investment is positively related to a number of proxies for mispricing and that investment is most sensitive to mispricing for firms with higher R&D intensities. Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) examine the impact of an increase in dispersion in beliefs about stock market valuation on both the cost of capital and corporate investment. They show that an increase in dispersion leads to a lower cost of capital for firms that exploit the mispricing by issuing shares. 29 We examined other windows surrounding the Nasdaq bubble and obtained similar results.
variables are quantitatively small and insignificant. For public entrants, the point estimates for current and lagged cash flow are quantitatively small and chi-squared tests reject statistical significance. In contrast, the point estimate for current stock issues is positive (0.179) and statistically significant.
The facts noted above lead to two predictions. First, if the supply of external public equity finance is a binding constraint on new entrant R&D, then the regression results suggest that the extremely large variation in public equity issues during the late 1990s and early 2000s should have resulted in a sharp rise and subsequent decline in R&D investment for pubic entrants. We note that large fluctuations in R&D are not common, and thus are not likely to occur simply because of chance. The second prediction is that incumbent firms, who are not equity dependent, should not exhibit a boom or bust in R&D.
In our sample, new entrant investment in R&D does in fact exhibit a boom and bust pattern. For new entrants, the median R&D-to-asset ratio in 1998 was 0.154, nearly identical to the median for the technological demand shocks for R&D are not driving our results. Instead, our evidence is consistent with major supply shifts in public equity finance, which should only matter for equity-dependent firms.
Greater access to public equity enabled entrants to sharply increase R&D in 1999 and 2000, and entrants
were then forced to curtail R&D when equity finance largely disappeared after 2000. These results strengthen our overall case that access to public equity finance is important for R&D and that many public entrants have no close substitutes, at the margin, for public equity.
D. Quantitative Interpretation and Robustness
To evaluate the quantitative importance of public equity, consider what our findings in Table 3 indicate We considered a large range of robustness tests for the empirical results presented above. We estimated all regressions using two-stage least squares (instead of GMM) and the main finding, once again, is that the only financial variable in the R&D regression that is economically important (and statistically significant) is new share issues. We also used lags for the instruments beginning at t-2 (instead of t-3) and instruments with lags from t-3 to either t-5 or t-6, and there were no quantitative changes in the results. We also explored different scale factors (in place of total assets in the R&D regression) and more severe trimming rules that excluded both the 1% and 2% tails and the main findings were unchanged. Finally, we estimated a set of error correction models identical to those in Bond et al. (2003, equation 4) . Specifically, we added financial variables to a baseline error-correction model that contained lagged investment, current and lagged sales growth and an error-correction term. In the R&D regressions, new share issues has nearly the same point estimate and is highly statistically significant, while cash flow remains statistically insignificant.
VI. The Impact of Public Entrants and Creative Destruction
The findings presented so far suggest that recent public entrants had the potential to have a major impact on the high-tech sector. In particular, our results have shown that a very large number of new public firms were created in the high-tech sector, these firms received heavy funding in their formative years, and this funding appears to have had a large impact on R&D, the type of investment most relevant for creative destruction. The rest of the paper explores whether these new entrants led to creative destruction in the high-tech sector.
In the tables that follow, we report results for the drug industry separately. The reason the drug industry is an outlier is straightforward. Drug companies in the U.S. must go through protracted clinical trials, often lasting one decade or more, before obtaining FDA approval. Furthermore, a large percentage of drug companies go public during clinical trials. As a consequence, these firms often have little or no sales for many years after the IPO. This lag in sales will be apparent in the tables that follow.
A. Survival by Cohort
By 2000, 71% of the incumbents had exited, underscoring the notion of creative destruction. For new entrants, the 5-year, 10-year, 15-year and 20-year survivor rates are very similar across most cohorts.
For example, the middle four cohorts have five-year survival rates of approximately 78% and ten-year survival rates of approximately 58%. These survival rates are much higher than reported in the literature, including the seminal studies by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988 and 1989) , which enhances the possibility of public entrants having a large impact on incumbents. Table 4 reports median R&D-to-sales ratios for entry cohorts and incumbents for selected years.
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B. R&D Intensity by Cohort
We examined the ratios for each high-tech industry and found no meaningful differences except for drugs, Table 5 reports the share of sales accounted for by incumbents and entry cohorts over time. Each firm's sales is assigned to a single three-digit industry, and then an aggregate sales figure is computed for the set of five high-tech industries (Panel A) and drugs (Panel B). Diversification is a potential problem as the largest firms are often diversified across multiple three-digit industries. However, for our application, diversification is not likely to be a significant issue, because when high-tech firms diversify, most of their sales are contained within the set of the five high-tech industries that make up Panel A of Table 5 . We do, however, have a direct way of checking on possible problems created by diversification.
C. Share of Sales
Beginning in the late 1990s, Compustat regularly reports each firm's sales disaggregated into its main four-digit SIC industries (business segment data). We used these numbers to compute share of sales of entrants and incumbents for 2000 and 2004 (see Appendix for details). These numbers should be very 33 See also Audretsch (1991 , Table 1 ) and Klepper (2002) . 34 The much higher R&D intensity of entrants is consistent with Acs and Audrestsch's (1988, 1990) findings that small firms (under 500 employees) have a much higher innovation-per-employee ratio than large firms in many high-tech industries, including our six high-tech industries.
accurate and provide a check on our other figures. A check of these numbers (in Appendix) shows that they are nearly identical to those reported in Table 5 .
For completeness, Table 5 reports information on the share of sales of "other" firms, who are firms that had no Compustat coverage prior to 1970 and were not listed in Thompson Financial's SDC New Issues data base. Fama and French (2004) also document a sizable number of new listings in CRSP which do not show up in their IPO data base, and they believe many of these firms are "best effort"
offerings. 35 We examined all large "other" firms and checked to see if they should be reclassified as incumbents or IPO firms. The large "other" firms are almost exclusively spinoffs, such as Lucent and Agilent. As is apparent in the tables, "other" firms, with the exception of 2000, account for only a small share of economic activity. Table 9 ), who find that new cohorts lose market share fairly rapidly over time. 37 The third (and most important) finding is that incumbents lose a great deal of market share to new public entrants. 38 By 2000, entrants had acquired almost 48% of high-tech sales, while incumbent market share had fallen to just 38.6% (37.0% using business segment data).
Incumbent's loss of market share is largest in the 1990s, the period of greatest availability of public equity. By 2004, however, incumbents experience a modest rebound in their market share. 39 This 35 In a "best effort offering," the underwriter acts as a broker, doing its best to sell the firm's offering to the public but never taking a personal position in the shares. The firms conducting a best efforts offering are typically very small and may not be traded initially on the major exchanges. 36 The market share of "other firms" is small until 2000, where three large spinoffs drive the share to nearly 13%. Spinoffs Lucent, Agilent and Avaya accounted for almost 60% of the total sales in the "others" category in 2000. 37 The explanation for the difference is likely due to multiple factors, including the fact that high-tech public entrants had high survival rates and very high real growth rates in the last two decades. In addition, the Dunne et al. (1988) study covers the time period 1963 to 1982, and our study shows that the impact of new public entrants is fairly small in the 1970s, even for high-tech industries. 38 For Tables 5 and 6 , we leave IBM in industry SIC 357 through 2000, even though IBM's primary SIC code changes to 737 (which is outside of manufacturing) in 1998. Because IBM is a very large incumbent, allowing IBM to switch would significantly increase the reported market shares of IPO firms.
temporary stabilization of market share of incumbents stands in contrast to the sharp loss of market share in the 1990s. This is expected, given the decline in availability of public equity after 2000 that curtailed the entry of new firms and slowed the expansion of previous entry cohorts.
Panel B explores the drug industry, which had over four hundred public entrants, concentrated heavily in 1990s. Yet as of 2000, incumbents have a market share exceeding eighty percent. We believe the main reason is that most entry was relatively recent and the process of running clinical trials and obtaining FDA approval can be very lengthy.
A natural question to ask is why incumbents in modern high-tech industries lost so much market share to entrants in the 1980s and 1990s, a time period long removed from the initial commercialization of the computer, the semi-conductor, etc. Our short explanation is improvement in access to public equity finance. Traditionally, it appears that the initial entrants (i.e., incumbents) have been exposed to the "perennial gale of creative destruction" for a relatively brief period of time. 40 In contrast, the Nasdaq came on line in 1971 and permitted a few thousand new firms in the six high-tech industries to go public and raise unprecedented sums of external finance. This process occurred with little interruption in the 1980s and 1990s until the collapse in Nasdaq prices, which temporarily reduced the availability of public finance and, in turn, curtailed the number of new entrants and stopped incumbent loss of market share.
To briefly explore the association between incumbent loss of market share and public finance, we ran a simple descriptive regression relating the evolution of cohort share of sales and sources of finance.
The data points are share of sales figures (at five-year intervals) as shown in Panel A of Table 5 . Let j stand for the cohort and t represent a particular period (e.g., 1975, 1980, etc.) . The left-hand side variable is ∆SALES jt , which is the change in share of sales between period t and t-1 for cohort j, while the righthand side variables are the flows of finance (CASHFLOW jt , STOCK jt , and DEBT jt , measured in hundreds of billions) raised by the cohort in the corresponding five-year period. The regression results (with standard errors) for the five-tech industries shown in Panel A, are as follows: These results show that only public equity issues are positively (and significant at the 6% level) associated with ∆SALES jt . This is consistent with the fact that the cohorts in the 1980s and 1990s tended to have both the sharpest gains in share of sales as well as the largest IPOs and the heaviest use of followup equity. The results are quantitatively similar if we include the drug industry. We ran the identical regression using firm level data (instead of cohort data) and obtained qualitatively similar results. Table 6 reports the shares of R&D for the entry cohorts and the incumbents over time. The findings in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5 Table 5 . Panel B is also broadly consistent with the findings in the corresponding panel in Table 5 , though public entrants in the drug industry account for a larger share of R&D than sales by the end of the sample period.
D. Share of R&D
We ran a descriptive regression identical to equation (2) (2) and (3) are only descriptive regressions, they are consistent with our argument that public equity finance played a significant role in the process of creative destruction in the high-tech sector.
E. Leading Firms
As is apparent in Table 7 , many new public entrants quickly became leading firms in their respective industries. Because of space limitations, we present detailed information for two of the largest industries in our study: office and computing equipment (Panel A) and electronic components (Panel B).
For these two industries, Table 7 
VII. Schumpeterian Creative Destruction and Other Implications
Our findings, including the swift displacement of many leading high-tech incumbents by R&D-intensive entrants are, in most ways, an excellent example of Schumpeter's (1942) Wall Street Journal, 5/12/2004) . 42 We recognize the life-cycle feature of new equity financing and sum net new equity issues until the firm becomes a net buyer of its equity (see Appendix). All financing figures are expressed in 2000 dollars.
competition as a "process of creative destruction." There is, however, at least one important difference.
Schumpeter envisioned entrants to be large established firms with the deep pockets needed to finance innovation. Schumpeter (1942, p. 101) argues that large-scale establishments "not only arise in the process of creative destruction, but in many cases of decisive importance they provide the necessary form for that achievement." Schumpeter (1942, p. 106) describes the large established firm as "the most powerful engine of economic progress." He does not praise young startup companies as engines of progress and is generally pessimistic about the ability of markets characterized by large numbers of small firms to be innovative. Contrary to Schumpeter's vision, our results suggest that new public entrants were the main source of creative destruction in the U.S. high-tech industry, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the ability of young high-tech firms to raise large amounts of public equity finance runs strongly counter to Schumpeter's views on the need for market power to self-finance innovation.
The findings we present are also likely relevant for understanding the relative performance of U.S.
and Europe in recent decades. Several recent studies, summarized in Aghion and Howitt (2005) , have advanced a "Schumpeterian Paradigm" of economic growth characterized by creative destruction through the entry of new innovators and the exit of former innovators. In this paradigm, entry, and the threat of entry, is the key determinate of economic performance. 43 Aghion and Howitt argue that the Schumpeterian Paradigm can readily explain the productivity gap that exits between the U.S. and Europe.
They state (2005, p. 8) that competitive policy in Europe has paid insufficient attention to entry, that entry rates have been low, and that "the lower degree of turnover in Europe compared to the US is an important part of the explanation for the relatively disappointing European growth performance over the past decade…"
A plausible explanation for part of the recent low rate of firm formation in France, Germany and
Italy is past problems in equity markets. Gompers and Lerner (2004, Chapter 14) discuss the nature of the decline in the availability of external equity finance in Europe in the late 1980 and the 1990s. In Europe there has been much public policy discussion concerning both the low numbers of high-tech public entrants and the lack of venture capital and follow-up public equity financing in the late 1980s and 43 See also Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2004) , and Howitt (1992 and 1998 
VIII. Conclusion
The goal of our paper has been to explore the role played by new public entrants and public equity finance in the recent ascent of the high-tech sector of U.S. manufacturing. Public equity finance, largely ignored in the literature, became increasingly important in the 1980s and 1990s and it was typically the main form of finance for high-tech public entrants early in their life-cycle. For public entrants, our estimates from a dynamic investment model indicate that public equity is the only form of finance that shares a statistically significant and economically important relationship with R&D investment. No such relationship exists for incumbents, consistent with the fact that they make relatively little use of public equity finance. Additional evidence emerges from the recent bubble in the Nasdaq which generated enormous variation in stock issues. We find that only equity-dependent entrants experienced a boom and bust in R&D investment between 1998-2002, consistent with supply shifts in equity finance. Together, these results suggest that shifts in the availability of public equity finance had a substantial impact on the R&D of new public entrants in recent years. 44 See for example the European Commission (1998). Venture capital has a much smaller impact in Europe compared to the United States (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002) . In addition, while most of U.S. venture capital is directed towards the high-tech sector (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) , this is not the case in Europe (European Commission, 1999) . Furthermore, follow-up equity financing for small high-tech firms is much lower in Europe compared to the U.S. (European Commission, 1998) . 45 According to Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994, updated We explored the share of sales (Table 5) Table 7 reports follow-up equity financing for leading firms in two key industries. We seek to measure the magnitude of new equity financing in the period of a firm's life cycle when it is a net seller of equity. To do this we summed net new equity finance until we reached a year in which the firm was a net buyer of equity (i.e., until net new share issues were negative). We then compared this value to the value generated by summing net equity finance over all years following the IPO (or, for incumbents, all the years between 1970 and 2000). We report the larger of the two values in Table 7 . Stopping at the first time the firm is a net buyer of equity has the potential to greatly understate the firm's use of equity finance, as firms may have a year or more when both sales and purchases of equity are quite small, resulting in a small negative values for net new share issues. 
